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1. Summary 
When an industrial accident occurs, e.g. the explosion or the fire of a chemical facility, soil investigations 
and subsequent risk mitigation generally need to be decided and performed rapidly. This requires specific 
organisation and tools:  
• Procedures for an immediate and coordinated intervention of relevant actors: industrials, 
administrations for industrial facilities, emergency and health, local authorities, environmental 
consultants and laboratories, NGOs. 
• Models and input data on emission, atmospheric transfer and deposition on soil, for an accidental 
source; investigation plans and adequate soil quality references, guidelines… 
But the European Seveso legislation, and its application in France and probably in Europe, is focused on 
the prevention of immediate impacts on health and constructions; and the Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control (IPPC) legislation deals with the chronic impacts of operating facilities. Thus, post-accidental 
impacts of industrial accidents are hardly dealt with, the specific organisation and tools are lacking, and 
when accidents occur, the industrials and administrations concerned are largely unprepared for managing 
their delayed impacts, first of them on soils. 
 
This paper will present the results, as concerns soil contamination, of a research on the “Organisation of 
Actors and Tools for the management of Post-accidental impacts of industrial accidents on the population 
and the environment” (Orgactoupost, 2007 - 2009).  
This research drew up a diagnosis of -and proposed solutions for- the current gap, in France, between the 
emergency response and the response to post-accidental impacts of industrial accidents on the 
environment and on human health. It was performed by a multidisciplinary team of health, environment 
and emergency experts, in relation with a network of relevant actors as mentioned above.  
The diagnosis and the solutions were elaborated through three steps: 
• Diagnosis, and identification and first formulation of recommendations, through a critical review of the 
regulations and practices in related fields: accidental and chronic risk management of industrial 
• Feed back on other accidents: train transporting fuel (Chavanay, 1990), fires of a warehouse for crop 
protection chemicals (Sandoz in Basel, 1986; Protex in Auzouer 1988)… 
• Feed back on the main tools of prevention and anticipation of the accidents such as the Seveso 
regulation, the Danger and impact studies for industrial facilities, the medical urgency plans. 
• Detailed analysis of the epidemiological approaches after a disaster (Verger and al ., 2005). 
For example, a paradox of the Seveso regulation and of its application, is that they address only little the 
main problematic of the Seveso accident: its post-accidental impact.  
 
The research drew up a diagnosis of -and proposed solutions for- the current gap, in France, between the 
emergency response and the response to post-accidental impacts of industrial accidents on the 
environment and on human health.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
Numerous actors are involved in the issue of delayed impacts of industrial incidents, operating in very 
different domains in terms of technical discipline, regulatory framework, functioning modalities, and 
intervention logics and dynamics (“emergency” vs. "chronic").  The research’s principle was to make these 
different domains and points of view meet together. 
 
In this view, the research was performed by a multidisciplinary team of health, environment and 
emergency experts, in relation with a supervising committee and a consultation network where the 
relevant actors were represented: industrials, administrations for industrial facilities, emergency and 
health, local authorities, environmental consultants and laboratories, NGOs.  
 
It was conducted through three steps: 
1. Diagnosis, and identification and first formulations of recommendations, through a critical review of the 
regulations and praxis in related fields: accidental and chronic risk management of industrial facilities 
and contaminated sites, epidemiology, emergency planning and community involvement. This step 
included an inquiry on past cases through interviews, and a study on the practices of the Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (US EPA) in the US emergency response. 
2. Amendment of the recommendations formulated in step 1, through 4 focus group discussions. 
3. Test and adjustment of the recommendations, through a case study exercise. 
The research was imbedded in two territories: “Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur - Languedoc-Roussillon” and 
“Nord-Pas-de-Calais – Picardie”.   
 
3.3. General results and conclusions of the research (summary) 
The relevance and the importance of the research problematic and of the identified issues were validated. 
The presence of a gap between the actors and tools of the urgency and the actors and tools of the public 
health and the environment was widely confirmed. As a consequence of this gap, in numerous cases, 
when an accident occurs, the site and accident managers are not prepared for assessing, limiting, and 
managing the post-accidental impacts. 
 
Nuances however appeared. For example, the protection of superficial waters benefits from a detailed 
system of prevention of post-accidental impacts. Besides, at the time of the accident, emergency services 
work, in the limit of their possibilities, on the prevention of the post-accidental impacts which they can 
immediately identify.  
 
Even if it is important to reduce this gap, the organization and actors of the urgency cannot be in charge of 
the post-emergency: their optics and working dynamics are too different. The question becomes to 
optimize the delicate articulation between separate systems. The post-accident phase should be animated 
by persons who are not monopolized by the management of the urgency, but in narrow relation with the 
management of the urgency and with a network of experts from the various relevant domains. 
 
Consequently, the recommendations formulated by the research team concern the doctrine, the 
responsibilities, the organization for post accidental situations, and the regulatory and technical tools 
associated: emergency plans, dossiers for industrial facilities, standards and tools for the evaluation and 
limitation of the deferred impacts. The recommendations are given, and commented for soil 
contamination, in the following section. 
 
The research team recommends that each stakeholder (ministries, local State services and communities, 
industrials, associations, engineering consulting firms, laboratories,…), at his/her/its level, appropriate 
these recommendations and decline them in operational terms: organization, systems, procedures and 
practices, regulation, tools and data. 
 
3.4. Results and conclusions concerning post-accidental soil contamination 
The recommendations are organized in 8 "General Recommendations” (GR) subdivised in 29 “Specific 
Recommandations” (SR). They are given and commented -when useful- for soil contamination. 
 
GR1: Clarify a doctrine for the organization of post accidental situations, define the responsibilities and 
provide according means. 
 
SR 1.1: Establish, in a concerted way, a doctrine for post-accidental situations, setting the basis of an 
organization of post-accidental management,  
• defining a vocabulary, and the responsibilities of state and local authorities, and proposing the terms 
of appointment of a leader and a steering body; 
• affirming the principles of a consultation with the community, of an ex ante preparation, of an 
articulation and / or a continuity between the emergency and the post-accidental phases to avoid gaps 
in the transmission of data and information; 
• defining a link with the French emergency organization (Orsec), bodies for technical support - post-
accidental local cell (CPAL) and national cell of support for post-emergency situations (CASPA); 
• deciding the development of methodological guides and support tools and support to players in the 
post-accident management; 
• drawing out an effective policy of feedback on post-accidental situations.  
 
These recommendations are developed below in "technical" terms.   
A good transmission of data and information is considered a key for a rapid and adequate investigation of 
soils and vegetables potentially polluted by the accident.   
 
SR 1.2: Give this body of doctrine a statutory basis and / or regulation. 
 
SR 1.3: Provide a mechanism for funding and allocation of human resources at all stages: preparation 
stages and phase post-accident management. 
 
GR2: Better articulate the emergency plans with the management of the post accidental situations. 
 
SR 2.1: Develop a general organization of the post-accident management articulated with the ORSEC and 
with a genuine regulatory and operational base.  
 
SR 2.2: In existing organizations and plans of the country, the cities, the facilities), define a better 
articulation with the post-accident 
 
SR 2.3: Develop recommendations and tools to identify the needs of launching a post-accident phase and 
determine its components: typology of encountered situations, “reflex sheets”... 
 
Everything can not be planned in post-accidental situations. Much place will be left to improvisation. But 
some guidelines can help prepare the actors and tools before the accident, and react correctly during and 
immediately after the accident. For example: 
• The emergency forces or other actors should acquire some images (video) and adequate samples 
(particles and gas) of the fumes, as well as site meteorological data (installing a weather station), so 
as to focus the site investigation on the right compounds and the right location. This is especially 
useful in the Facility Intervention Plan (for Seveso sites) which is triggered when an important accident 
occurs on the facility. 
• Official instructions regarding the consumption of home-grown vegetable should be readily available. 
• The Mobile Cells for Chemical Interventions (CMIC), could possibly be prepared to fume-sampling 
and equipped with the adequate devices: they currently measure only simple compounds (dust, HCl, 
SO2,…) and at high levels, with the objective of protecting the emergency personal.  
The typology would help deciding when a site investigation and risk assessment is needed.  The reflex 
sheet would recall those instructions and would tell to whom the site observations and data should be 
communicated (persons in charge of the post-accidental site assessment).  
 
GR3: Better integrate the delayed impacts of accidents in the administrative dossiers for new industrial 
facilities. 
 
For a quick but adequate site investigation, site assessment and risk-reducing actions, the immediate 
availability of relevant site-specific data (inputs and outputs) and tools (see SP 3.1, most of the items are 
related to soil or vegetable contamination) in relation with possible post-accidental impacts would be very 
useful.  
Currently in France, when an accident occurs, the site manager and the accident manager are not 
prepared for assessing, limiting, and managing the post-accidental impacts. Those data and tools are not 
available. They have little information and no definitive answers to provide to the community, which may 
feel outraged by what they may consider as a failure of the responsible persons. 
 
Actually, in the regulation for industrial facilities, post-accidental impacts belong to the scope of the 
technological risk study within the authorization dossier. But they are not included in the operational 
guidance for this study, and then in the practice not considered in the dossiers. 
. 
SR 3.1: In the technological risk studies for new facilities, integrate a risk analysis of delayed impacts of 
an accident, and also, when the issues at stakes justify it: 
• An ex-ante and revisable assessment on the basis of scenarios, to which it can be referred to. This  
assessment  would document the key parameters: 
o Terms of the source (relevant compounds, quantities, modalities of combustion and of 
emission...) 
o Terms of the transfer (especially modeling of the atmospheric dispersion), 
o Toxicological Reference Values for key compounds and delayed impacts. 
• A proportionate process for assessment and mitigation in case of an accident, including, depending 
on the issues: 
o Monitoring plan of the environment around the site for key post-accidental compounds; 
o Technical plan and device for assessing and limiting the delayed impacts of an accident: 
collecting environmental data, taking care of employees,… 
o Financial guarantees covering the remediation of the possible impacted area (and not only 
for the immediate safety measures). 
 
When the accident happens, it will not be possible to just take the ex ante assessment as it is: the 
accident will not necessarily take place as in the anticipated scenario and conditions, and some data from 
the dossier of the facility can be obsolete and should be updated (including Toxicological Reference 
Values). The anticipation through the dossier still remains valuable for: 
• Immediate information on possible consequences: intensity, impact area,... 
• Immediate availability of key risk factors, which will drive the proportionate assessment and risk 
mitigation process; 
• The rapidity of an adjustment: in the modeling, the most-time consuming  operation is the construction 
of the site-specific model. 
A prerequisite is that the concerned actors (industrial, local environmental authority) consult the 
authorization dossier at the time of the accident. This action shall be included in the reflex-sheet of these 
actors (RG 5).  
The rapid adjustment of the assessment at the time of the accident can be a difficult issue. A minima, the 
industrial should have the initial set of modelling data, ready to be re-injected into an adjusted modeling. 
Ideally, the contractual relationship between the industrial and its environmental consultant for the 
technological risk study could include the possibility of a rapid adjustment (typically 1 day) of the modeling 
in case of accident. This type of relationship exists in the USA (at least between the US EPA and 
consultants: Poulet, 2008), but seems much more difficult in France. 
 
The usefulness and the feasibility of a monitoring of the environment around the site for key post-
accidental compounds were strongly discussed within the focus groups and the steering committee. The 
key questions are: how these data actually be used in case of an accident, and what would be the extent 
of the involved means: 
1. For a global comparison with a commonly encountered background level, a documentary approach 
may be sufficient. This comparison will decide soon after the accident of the existence or absence of a 
major impact on the environment; 
2. When deciding whether the accident impacted (even slightly) the surrounding environment, it is 
necessary to have more precise data, with measurement points and substances specific to the post-
accidental issues1, monitored more or less frequently depending of the expected time-variability. In 
case of an observed absence of significant impact, the site assessment can be stopped, particularly 
avoiding the very uncertain -and easily subject to debate- step of health risk assessment. This 
assessment strategy is however applicable only to persistent pollutants: metals, dioxins / furans, 
PCBs, phthalates, PAHs, as opposed e.g. to most plant protection products. 
 
SR 3.2: Based on the feedback and expert judgment: 
• identify the types of industrial facilities or activities (transport of dangerous material, ...) not subject to 
the hazard study and presenting particularly important post-accidental issues. 
• and integrate prescriptions to preserve these issues into the standard documents governing these 
types of facilities or activities. 
 
The reason of this SR is that industrial accidents with major often happen at small facilities, which are 
submitted to standard documents instead of the site-specific hazard studies imposed on larger facilities. It 
is nevertheless acknowledged that not all possible cases can be foreseen and prepared (for ex. in France, 
fire of a wood storage on soils strongly contaminated by PCBs, in 2009). 
 
GR4: Organize the actors concerned to accompany the transition between the urgency and the 
management of possible delayed impacts. 
 
This recommendation aims at reducing the gap between actors of the emergency and actors of the post-
accident, while accepting that the post-emergency must remain separated from the emergency. So the 
goal is to arise the reciprocal understanding of needs and constraints, and to establish a dialog before the 
accident, and during and after the emergency phase, with a structure and roles that shall evolve over time. 
A strong recommendation is to associate health and environmental local authorities in the leadership of 
these structures.  
It is expected that actions concerning delayed impacts that should be realised during or immediately after 
the accident (for soil quality assessment: visual observation and sampling of fumes,…) would gain better 
chances to be realized in time,  
 
SR 4.1: In an industrial accident -as soon as possible, at best during the emergency phase- allow to 
identify post-accident issues, to alert if necessary and to anticipate the associated needs for assessment 
and management.  
 
SR 4.2: At the level of a department or of a “risk territory”, create an active network of preparation to 
industrial post-accident.  
 
SR 4.3: In case of an industrial accident, if the issues justify it, create a local post-accident cell. 
 
                                                   
1 They will not be the same as those of the monitoring of a normal functioning of a facility, which looks at the 
“normally” emitted compounds (not combustion sub-products for example) in the main wind direction (whereas an 
accident can occur while the wind blows in another direction). 
If an emergency command centre has been created, the post-accident cell should be directly connected to 
it: the cell would advise on immediate actions concerning delayed impacts and receive from it the 
information useful for the investigation plan and the assessment of delayed impacts.  
After the suppression of this emergency command centre, the post-accident cell should be enlarged to 
members from this command centre, so as to ensure the continuity of the action and of the 
communication. 
The research team recommends to immediately open the post-accident cells to representatives of the 
community and of local organisations. 
 
SR 4.4: Create a national cell of expertise in support of post accidental situations. 
 
GR5: Develop ex-ante rules for action and standards and tools for assessing and reducing the various 
types of delayed impacts. 
 
SR 5.1: Make a list of the reference tools necessary, with their specifications, and prioritize them in term of 
urgency of completion. 
 
SR 5.2: Develop shared reference tools for the assessment (ex-ante and ex-post) and the reduction of 
post-accidental impacts: 
• Reflex sheets   : Typology and alert criteria for triggering a specific and graduated management of the 
post accident starting already in the emergency phase; "what-to-do" during the emergency phase, 
"families of products". 
• Sampling Protocols: fumes in a fire, dust deposits,... 
• Risk modeling modules: source terms, atmospheric dispersion models for an accidental source, 
transfer models of fire extinction water towards groundwater and surface water, toxicological 
reference values including for sub-chronic exposure, standards on human exposure, ... 
• Standards for assessing the state of the environment (air, water, plants, soil): regulatory values, soil 
quality standards, and generic soil background values,... 
• Guides of good practices for the impact assessment: choosing correctly values within databases; 
elaborating the initial description of the area and comparing new site data with this initial state or with 
local control points; performing the right field investigations during and after the accident (e.g. fire); 
combining measure and model; gathering health, social and economic data; implementing 
epidemiological surveillance systems, ... 
 
SR 5.3: Develop a research about the compounds and quantities emitted by industrial fires, explosions,... 
 
SR 5.4: Establish a network of analytical and sampling laboratories that can intervene urgently with a view 
to assessing delayed impacts (immediate human exposure, impacts on the environment, bio-monitoring). 
  
After an accident, conservatory site-use restrictions can be recommended or imposed by the authorities, 
e.g. not to eat own-grown vegetable. A rapid confirmation or suppression of these safety measures is 
needed. Sufficiently simple and clear activation and payment rules must be organized, so as to avoid any 
loss of time in the emergency phase. 
This network will necessarily be evolutionary. It will include immobile laboratories and mobile laboratories 
(fire departments, Civil Security,…). 
 
SR 5.5: Develop a method for calculating financial guarantee for the delayed impacts. 
 
SR 5.6: Develop standards for the local preparation to the assessment of delayed impacts and to the 
management of post-accidental situations 
• Geographic Information System (GIS) of impact areas, of potential targets, relevant actors; 
• Preparation for the collection of health data through perennial or ad hoc epidemiological systems 
(hospital data, data collected from the health insurance, or from sentinel physician networks ...) 
• Modalities for achieving an exercise and experience-feedback (cf. GR 7 and GR8) 
• ... 
  
GR6: Inform and listen to the community and their representatives, involve them in the management of 
delayed impacts of industrial accidents. 
 
 
SR 6.1: Systematize the attention to the community, to its intermediaries and representatives, at all stages 
of the planning and implementation of the management of the post-accidental situation. 
 
The dialog with the community is necessary for more thrust in, and acceptance of, the decisions 
eventually made. It is also essential to improve the quality of the studies and of the decision. The Comrisk 
guide and toolbox for organizing community involvement on contaminated sites (INERIS-IRSN, 2008, 
www.comrisk.fr; Hazebrouck et al., 2008) can be used. However, specific difficulties of community 
involvement for post accidental situations have been identified: 
• The outrage felt by the community because of the sudden intrusion in their life of a risk that had been 
declared “under control”, possibly increased by a disorganisation and inconsistencies in the 
emergency response, and the feeling to be “forgotten” or not considered seriously in the response 
(during the fire of a warehouse for crop protection chemicals that occurred in Béziers in 2005, a 
resident outside of the town had to hear on the radio that fortunately the fumes had gone in the 
direction of her home and garden instead of the town). 
• The dynamics of the response to the accident or to the post-accidental situation, that is and has to be 
much faster as for a contaminated site. This is particularly a problem, because establishing a good 
relationship with the community requires time and should be done before the problem arises, and also 
because it may prove difficult to find and reach the relevant people in the haste (and possibly 
confusion, like after the AZF explosion in Toulouse, 2001) of the accident. 
These two specific difficulties lead the research project to insist on the ex-ante community involvement on 
industrial risk (SR 6.2). 
 
It is essential to motivate these stakeholders through the effective demonstration of their influence: as a 
support to decisions, as a contribution to an efficient and well coordinated "technical" response. This 
recommendation should be integrated in the implementation of all the other recommendations made here. 
 
SR 6.2: Prepare ex-ante, at the scale of a “risk territory”, then develop and implement at the site scale 
when an accident occurs, a scheme for the information and involvement of the community, its 
intermediaries and representatives, in the management of post-accidental situations, including the 
followings aspects: 
• The information, adapted to the different targets, distinguishing the communities directly affected and 
those more distant. 
• The development of systems / processes for listening and dialoguing, answering, and bringing 
feedback on what has been done and not done and why. 
• The participation of the community to the expertise and to the preparation of decisions, particularly 
through involvement of representatives in consultation and expertise mechanisms: local network for 
readiness to the post-accident, post-accidental monitoring committee, post-accident cell. 
• The community involvement of people in gathering information relevant to the risk assessment and 
management, as well as in the preparation of individual prevention or reparation actions. 
• The preparation and training of all stakeholders of the management of post-accidental situations, to 
dialogue and consultation: representatives of local authorities and of the community, administrations, 
industrials and potential contractors (among others, prepare methodology fact-sheets and guides to 
help manage situations of uncertainty). 
 
 
SR 6.3: Integrate post-accident issues (concepts, issues, doctrine) in all existing approaches to 
information, consultation and training on industrial pollution and risk, as they address the population 
directly or through intermediaries or through existing consultation mechanisms. 
 
GR7: Integrate the post- accidental phase in a more systematic and better exploited system of 
experience-feedback. 
 
SR 7.1: Develop a methodological guide for the triggering and conduct of experience-feedback. 
  
A procedure should be implemented in a systematic way to help decide the opportunity of an experience-
feedback. Indeed, it is neither possible nor desirable to undertake a process of experience-feedback on 
each accident situation because it would not be feasible, but it is also undesirable to leave the triggering of 
an experience-feedback to the appreciation of the political authorities. Trigger criteria should be defined to 
trigger an experience-feedback for events with significant potential for learning. 
 
Methods and a guide should be developed to allow a smooth conduct of experience-feedback: the 
purpose of experience-feedback is to understand, not judge. The experience-feedback is a discipline in 
itself, transverse, with a state of good practices. These good practices should be brought the experience-
feedback on post-accidental situations. 
  
SR 7.2: Better take into account the post-accidental phase in the existing experience-feedback on 
industrial accidents, and document its articulation with the emergency phase. 
   
SR 7.3:  Realize an integrated analysis of the different experience-feedbacks (for the same accident or 
for different accidents) 
  
SR 7.4: Disseminate the experience-feedbacks and their lessons towards the parties who have been 
involved in the respective accidents, towards the parties preparing post-accidental situations, towards 
concerned professionals involved, and into the public debate. 
  
 SR 7.5: Evaluate regularly the use of the results of the experience-feedbacks (institutional improvements, 
revaluation of actions). 
  
GR8: Organize the training of actors, the experience sharing and the diffusion of good practices for a 
better management of post accidental situations. 
   
SR 8.1: Develop training courses and know-how learning, so as to better prepare the different 
stakeholders to the management of post-accidental situations.  
  
 SR 8.2: Train referent persons, who might intervene in all disciplines during accidents, and include this 
goal in the evolution schemes of training. 
  
 SR 8.2: Develop exercises on the change from the accidental to the post-accidental phase, and on the 
phase of post-accidental management of medium and long term consequences of industrial accidents. 
  
4. Acknowledgements 
The research was financially supported by the French Ministry in charge of the Environment. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessary represent those of the funding 
organization. 
5. References 
CIRE Nord - DDASS02, 2002. Risques toxiques liés à l’exposition aux polychlorobiphényles. Etude de 
l’incendie de la papeterie de Venizel - Modalités de l’intervention, dispositif de surveillance médicale, 
évaluation des risques. Stéphane SARTHOU, Christophe HEYMAN, Cyril PISSON, Danièle ILEF, Cécile 
LHEUREUX, Magalie SIGNOLET, Francis GOUX, Françoise DEBAISIEUX. Cellule interrégionale 
d’epidémiologie nord2 Direction Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales de l’Aisne. Décembre 
2002. www.invs.sante.fr. 
CPP, 2008. Comité de la Prévention et de la Précaution. Catastrophes environnementales : préparer 
l’évaluation de leurs effets et le retour d’expérience. Ministère de l’Ecologie, du Développement et de 
l’Aménagement durables. Paris, 2008, pp 56. 
CEDRE, 2004. Gestion des Matériaux Pollués et Polluants issus d’une Marée Noire. Guide opérationnel. 
2004. http://www.cedre.fr/fr/publication/guides/mpp.html. 
CEDRE, 2005. Intégration des risques de pollution accidentelle des eaux de surface dans les études de 
dangers. R.05.31.C/3145. Août 2005. 
Hazebrouck B., Baumont G., Legout C., Marot F., 2008. A guide and a toolbox for public involvement in 
the assessment and the management of contaminated sites. Proceedings of the 10th International UFZ-
Deltares/TNO conference on soil-water systems : CONSOIL 2008, 3-6 june 2008, Milano, Italy.  
INERIS, 2000. Evaluation du risque sanitaire résiduel pour les populations fréquentant les plages polluées 
par le fioul rejeté par l'ERIKA, après dépollution. Rapport final. InVS, INERIS. 2000. 
INERIS, 2005. Estimation de l'exposition aux fumées de l'incendie du 27/06/2005 sur le site de SBM 
Formulation à Béziers. Rapport d'étude N° 71165/P01 b. S. DUPLANTIER, B. HAZEBROUCK, L. 
MOSQUERON, A. BAULIG, P. HUBERT. Octobre 2005. 
INERIS, 2006. Evaluation des impacts des fumées de l’incendie de SBM Formulation. Comparaison des 
mesures environnementales à des référentiels. Luc MOSQUERON, B. HAZEBROUCK. INERIS-DRC-06-
72959/ERSA-R50F 13/06/2006. 
INERIS-IRSN, 2008. Guide pour l'implication des populations dans l’évaluation et la gestion d’un site ou 
sol pollué. En collaboration avec la Cire Ile de France. B. Hazebrouck, G. Baumont, C. Legout. INERIS 
DRC-07-61078-17527B. Mars 2008. www.comrisk.fr. 
Poulet, C., 2008. ATSDR and EPA Emergency Response. Presentation at the Orgactoupost steering 
committee. 20 June 2008. 
RICOUX (C.). Incendie de l'usine SBM Formulation à Béziers. Évaluation de l'impact sanitaire immédiat 
de l'exposition par voie respiratoire. 53 pages. Janvier 2006. www.invs.sante.fr. 
VERGER P., AULAGNIER M., SCHWOEBEL V., LANG T. – Démarches épidémiologiques après une 
catastrophe. Anticiper les catastrophes : enjeux de santé publique, connaissances, outils et méthodes. - 
Réponses Environnement, Ministère de l'Ecologie et du Développement durable. La Documentation 
Française, Paris, ISBN n° 2-11-005748-3, Octobre 20 05, 265 pages. Paricipation de Ph. HUBERT et de 
C. RICOUX. 
